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We develop a two-sectors small open economy model with imperfect competition,
one-period nominal price rigidities and a ￿nancial accelerator mechanism. The latter
assumes an asymmetric information problem between lenders and capital good producers
(entrepreneurs). Studying the zero-in￿ation steady state, it is shown that the model
with the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism nests a fairly standard RBC model; case in
which entrepreneurs \disappear" as a di￿erentiated sector from households. It is also
explained that credit market imperfections essentially reduce the aggregate supply of
capital relative to the RBC case. Turning to the dynamics, we study the e￿ects of an
unanticipated and permanent increase in the level of the money supply. In this context
the exchange rate jumps immediately to its new steady state level without showing any
overshooting process as in Dornbusch (1976). Analysing the case without credit market
imperfections but with pre-set prices, it is demonstrated that money is not neutral in
the long-run, that capital adds persistence to the initial shock, and that some traditional
results of the Mundell-Fleming model still hold.
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11 Introduction
The classical Mundell-Fleming model shows that a currency depreciation has expansionary
e￿ects on output through expenditure-switching e￿ects. This ￿nding is also obtained in the
well-known model developed by Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (1995). Although there is a long-standing
debate on whether this e￿ect holds for developing countries or not (see Ag￿ enor and Montiel
1999 for a survey), the recent experiences of contractionary depreciations have revitilised
the discussion. To illustrate, Table 1 shows the negative association that existed between
currency depreciations and real GDP growth rate for a number of selected countries. It is
also noteworthy that the CPI in￿ation rate has been in all these cases below the WPI in￿ation
rate1.
Table 1. Selected macroeconomic indicators
Country Year Nominal depreciation CPI in￿ation WPI in￿ation Real GDP growth rate
(Dec-yt/Dec-yt￿1) -in %-
Argentina 2002 67.4 25.9 78.3 -10.9
Indonesia 1998 70.9 57.6 80.4 -13.1
Korea 1998 32.1 7.5 12.2 -6.9
Malaysia 1998 28.3 5.3 10.8 -7.4
Philippines 1998 27.9 9.7 11.7 -0.6
Thailand 1998 24.2 8.1 12.2 -10.5
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Calvo and Reinhart (1999) have pointed out that ￿nancial factors can be critical to under-
stand contractionary depreciations. When liabilities are denominated in the foreign currency
while assets are denominated in the domestic currency, the argument goes, an exchange rate
depreciation increases the domestic value of liabilities. If the domestic value of assets does not
increase pari passu with the exchange rate, indebted agents face negative net worth e￿ects.
This explanation is thus a reinterpretation of the debt-de￿ation mechanism stressed by Fisher
(1933), but in the context of small open economies. Krugman (1999) has ￿rstly formalised
this argument in a highly stylised and static model. He shows that a combination of currency
mismatches in the private sector, imperfections in credit markets and sudden changes in ex-
pectations could have explained what happened in the 1997-8 South East Asian crisis. To
give an insight on the importance of private sector’s foreign currency denominated liabilities,
Figure 1 shows the total claims of foreign banks on the non-bank private sector for the same
countries analysed in Table 1.
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Figure 1. Claims of foreign banks on non-bank private sector
This rather imperfect measure of ￿nancial \dollarisation"2,3 puts forward the idea that
foreign currency denominated debt has been an important element in the forefront of the
currency depreciations in these countries.
Aghion et al (2000, 2001) follow the same line of reasoning as Krugman (1999), but provide
a higher degree of formalisation. In particular, they assume the production of a single tradable
good that faces one-period nominal price rigidities, in a context where the private sector has
liabilities denominated in the foreign currency. An exchange rate depreciation thus generates
negative net worth e￿ects that reduce investment and output (i.e., balance-sheet e￿ects).
Besides the lack of microfoundations present in their approach4, the assumption that
the tradable good sector faces nominal price rigidities seems to be an important drawback
of their model. In this regard, Burstein et al (2005) show, analysing 5 recent episodes of
large devaluations5, that the main source of changes in the real exchange rate has been the
slow adjustment in the prices of nontradable goods. This can provide an explanation of the
relatively lower increase in the CPI in￿ation rate (since this index is highly in￿uenced by
nontradable goods) vis a vis the WPI in￿ation rate observed in Table 1.
The objective of this paper is thus to provide a rigorous though realistic framework in
which to analyse why currency depreciations can be contractionary in the short-run. With
2Financial dollarisation is a widely used expression to indicate that the liabilities of certain sectors in a
country are denominated in the foreign currency. Notice, however, that this foreign currency is not necessarily
the US dollar.
3In particular, owing to lack of information we are not able to discriminate the currency of denomination
of these liabilities. However, being the creditors foreign banks, it seems to be very likely that these loans were
denominated in foreign currencies. Notice also that we are explicitly excluding currency mismatches in the
public sector, which has been a critical feature specially in the Argentine crisis in 2001/2.
4For example, they directly postulate the existence and the form of credit constraints without deriving it
from primitive assumptions.
5They consider the cases of Argentina (2002), Brazil (1999), Korea (1997), Mexico (1994) and Thailand
(1997).
3this aim, we develop a well microfounded dynamic monetary general equilibrium model for
a small open economy that considers a tradable and nontradable sector, imperfections in
credit and goods markets, currency mismatches and one-period nominal price rigidities in the
intermediate nontradable good.
Following Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (1996, Ch. 10.2) the output of the tradable sector will be
assumed exogenous. Since we want to concentrate our attention in the nontradable sector, this
assumption highly simpli￿es the analysis without a￿ecting the main objectives of the paper.
The nontradable sector is composed of a ￿nal producer ￿rm, which is perfectly competitive,
and a continuous number of intermediate ￿rms that face monopolistic competition as in
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
The production of capital is modelled as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). This capital
is afterwards utilised by intermediate ￿rms. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs, each
one producing capital with only one input, which is part of the ￿nal nontradable good. The
production function of each entrepreneur has an idiosyncratic and stochastic element. To
determine the amount of investment placed in production, entrepreneurs utilise their net
worth in conjunction with external funding. This funding is, however, subject to frictions due
to the presence of an asymmetric information problem between lenders and entrepreneurs.
All the borrowing that entrepreneurs obtain is assumed to be denominated in the foreign
currency.
Cespedes et al (2004) develop a similar model but with only one sector of production
(tradable) and sticky wages. In the present paper we consider two sectors and fully ￿exible
wages. Choi and Cook (2004), Cook (2004) and Devereux et al (2006) are probably the
closest references. Essentially, all these models build on variants of the ￿nancial accelerator
mechanism developed in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al (1999). However,
besides some important di￿erences in the speci￿cation of the models, they are only interested
in numerical solutions to evaluate di￿erent exchange rate and monetary policies. Hence, there
are relevant results and interactions that are hidden in the \black box" typically associated
with calibration methods. In contrast, the present paper’s objective is to work through
the analytics of the model so as to provide, whenever possible, an analytical solution that
highlights in a transparent way the mechanisms by which monetary and exchange rate policies
a￿ect the economy.
Although this paper is still work in progress, there are a number of intermediate results
worth emphasizing. We ￿rstly studied the properties of the model in the zero-in￿ation steady
state. We show that those variables associated with the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism yield
4simple steady state solutions; depending only on the subjective discount factor, monitoring
costs and the fraction of expected pro￿ts that entrepreneurs devote to consumption. Compar-
ing the cases with and without credit market imperfections we show that the latter converges
to a fairly standard RBC model in which entrepreneurs \disappear" as a di￿erentiated class
from households. It is also shown that credit market imperfections essentially reduce the
supply of capital relative to the RBC case.
Turning to the dynamics, we study an unexpected and permanent increase in the level
of the money supply under a ￿oating exchange rate regime. It is shown that the nominal
exchange rate immediately jumps to its new steady state level, therefore not showing any
overshooting process as in Dornbusch (1976). As Fender and Rankin (2003) point out, this
particular feature is a direct consequence of the household’s logarithmic preferences assumed
in the model. Without credit market imperfections and zero initial net foreign assets the
monetary expansion with pre-set prices improves the short-run trade balance surplus, giving
place to an accumulation of net-foreign assets. Owing to this e￿ect money is not neutral
in the long run. It is thus possible to show that the ￿nal nontradable output is positively
a￿ected in the short- and long-run. It is also explained that the long-run neutrality of money
is recovered eliminating capital from the model.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the main elements
of the model with the exception of the production of the capital good. Section 3 explains
how capital is produced in the economy and develops the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism.
Section 4 deals with aggregation and de￿nes the equilibrium conditions of the model. Section
5 analyses the steady state. Section 6 deals with the dynamics of the model. Section 7
presents concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a small open economy model with two sectors: one tradable and one nontrad-
able. The economy is composed of ￿rms, households, the government and entrepreneurs that
mutually interact within a monetary framework. The remainder of this section describes in
detail the characteristics of each sector.
52.1 Firms
2.1.1 Tradable sector
There is a single homogeneous tradable good whose supply is constant and exogenously given
each period t and is denoted by YT;t = Y T
6: This output, in turn, becomes each period
household’s endowment.
2.1.2 Nontradable sector
The nontradable sector is composed of a continuum of intermediate ￿rms that produce di￿er-
entiated inputs and a perfectly competitive producer of the nontradable ￿nal good. There are
a large number of ￿rms indexed by i in the intermediate sector, where each one specialises in
producing a particular input. Each ￿rm, therefore, has some degree of monopoly power over
its production. The imperfect competition in the production of nontradable inputs combined
with nominal price rigidities in setting their prices (as explained below), provide an economic
framework in which to rationalise that output could be demand-determined in the short-run.
The intermediate output of ￿rm i at period t is produced by combining capital and labour





i;t ; i 2 [0;1]; 0 < ￿ ￿ 1; (1)
where Zi;t indicates the production of input i, At is a technology parameter assumed to be
common to all ￿rms, Ki;t is the stock of capital rented to entrepreneurs at the beginning of
period t; Li;t indicates labour services obtained from households and ￿ is the share of capital
in the nontradable intermediate input (which is assumed to be the same for all ￿rms).
The producer of the ￿nal nontradable good combines the inputs provided by intermediate
￿rms and a tradable input with a Cobb-Douglas-type production function. This output is
afterwards sold to domestic agents for consumption or to entrepreneurs for using it as an
input in the production of the capital good. The production function of a representative ￿rm










1￿￿; ￿ > 1; 0 < ￿ < 1; (2)
where Yt is the ￿nal nontradable good, ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between di￿erent
nontradable inputs, ￿ is the share of nontradable components in the ￿nal nontradable good
and XT;t is the tradable input that is used in producing the ￿nal good. This production
6A similar assumption is taken, for instance, in Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (1996, Ch. 10.2).
6function intends to capture the fact that there are di￿erentiated nontradable inputs required
to produce a ￿nal good, such as transport services, retailing, etc. Each intermediate ￿rm in











where PT;t; Pi;t and Pt are the prices of the tradable good, the intermediate good and the
￿nal good, respectively. It is worth noting that the marginal cost of the ￿nal producer ￿rm















￿: We can therefore rewrite
the demand curve that each intermediate ￿rm faces as,












It will be considered that the law of one price (LOOP) holds for tradable goods at all t,
implying that,
PT;t = St;
where St denotes the nominal exchange rate measured as the domestic price of foreign
exchange. Note that the foreign price of the tradable good was normalised to one.
2.1.3 Demand for factors by intermediate ￿rms
Intermediate ￿rms determine their demand for factors by solving the following cost minimi-











t indicates the nominal rental price of capital and Wt denotes the nominal wage.
It is worth highlighting that Ki;t is a homogeneous capital good demanded by intermediate
￿rms and supplied by a large number of entrepreneurs. This capital completely depreciates
within the period. Li;t; on the other hand, is a homogeneous type of labour demanded by
intermediate ￿rms and supplied by a large number of households. Since both inputs are
homogeneous, supplied by a large number of agents and demanded by a large number of
7The ￿nal good producer solves the following cost minimisation problem:
min
R 1






￿￿1g￿fXT;tg1￿￿; giving the inverse demand function
stated in Eq. 3.
8Notice that in equilibrium, the marginal cost of the ￿nal producer ￿rm will be equal to the price of the
￿nal good, Pt.
7￿rms, at the individual level each ￿rm takes the nominal rental price of capital Rk
t and the
nominal wage Wt as given.






























Note that the cost function evaluated at K￿
i;t and L￿















2.1.4 Pro￿t maximisation problem of intermediate ￿rms
Intermediate ￿rms determine the price level Pi;t and output Zi;t that maximise pro￿ts subject
to the cost function obtained in Eq. 8 and the inverse demand function stated in Eq. 4,
max
fPi;tg
￿i;t = Pi;tZi;t ￿ C
￿



























￿￿1 is a markup over marginal costs9.
This equation de￿nes how intermediate ￿rms optimally set the price level of their output
Pi;t. It is worth highlighting that ￿rms decide the price level that will prevail at period t at














where Ei;t￿1 indicates the expectation hold by agent i at the end of period t ￿ 1 given
the information available at that time. This model assumes \perfect foresight". Therefore,
the above expression will be identical to Eq. 9 for all periods but t = 0; when an unexpected
shock hits the economy. During that period, the price Pi;0 di￿ers from what ￿rm i would
9Note that in the perfectly competitive case, when ￿ ! 1; the price of the intermediate ￿rm is equal to
the marginal cost.
8have optimally chosen had it known the shock in advance. It is in this context that we can
consider that the price level of the intermediate ￿rm i is \given" at period t = 0.
2.2 Households
The representative household obtains utility from consumption of the ￿nal good Ct, real
money balances Mt
Pt
10 and leisure (given by the disutility associated with working in the pro-
duction of the nontradable input ￿￿
2(Lt)2): Therefore, lifetime utility of the representative













The budget constraint that the household faces when maximising utility, expressed in
nominal terms, is de￿ned by,
PtCt + Mt + StDt+1 = PT;tY T + WtLt + ￿t + StR
￿
tDt + Mt￿1 + PtTt: (11)
Household’s sources of funding are given by the endowment of the tradable good PT;tY T;
wage earnings for working in the nontradable intermediate sector WtLt; dividends from own-
ing intermediate ￿rms ￿t; nominal gross return from previous-period foreign currency de-
nominated deposits StR￿
tDt
11, holdings of previous period nominal money balances Mt￿1 and
lump-sum government transfers PtTt
12. These resources are used to purchase consumption
goods PtCt, to accumulate nominal money balances Mt or to acquire new interest-bearing
deposits StDt+1.
First order conditions associated to this problem are obtained by maximising Eq. 10 with
















10The fact that households obtain utility from real balances is common in the Money-in-the-Utility function
literature. It can be thought as money generating utility owing to the services that it provides in facilitating
transactions (see Walsh 2003).
11Since one of the main objectives of the model is highlighting problems associated with currency mis-
matches, it is assumed that households only hold deposits denominated in the foreign currency.









Eq. 12 is a Euler equation indicating that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption
in two subsequent periods must be equal to the real interest rate. Note that the UIP condition
takes the form Rt+1 = R￿
t+1
St+1
St ; where Rt+1 and R￿
t+1 indicate the gross nominal risk-free
domestic and foreign interest rates, respectively.
The demand for real balances stated in Eq. 13 is positively associated with consumption
and the weight in the utility function of having an extra-unit of real balances; and negatively
related to the gross nominal interest rate. Finally, the labour supply equation shown in Eq.
14 increases in the real wage, while decreases in consumption and in the weight that the
household gives to the disutility of working.
2.3 Government
It is assumed that government spending a￿ects only the ￿nal nontradable good. In this simple
setting, the only source of funding for the government’s current spending and the lump-sum
transfer that the government makes towards households is real seigniorage. Observe that the
interpretation of Tt is twofold: whenever it takes a positive value it refers to a lump-sum
transfer from the government to households, while if it takes a negative value it implies a
lump-sum tax paid from households to the government. The government’s budget constraint
can therefore be expressed as,




where Gt indicates government’s expenditure on the ￿nal good and
(Mt￿Mt￿1)
Pt is the real
seigniorage that the government is obtaining for issuing money between t and t ￿ 1. In
facilitating the analysis, unless otherwise stated, it will be assumed that Gt ￿ 0 and therefore
any revenue due to seigniorage is immediately rebated to households in a lump-sum way.
3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs will play a central role in the model. They will produce the capital good that is
afterwards rented to ￿rms. In producing the capital good, however, they must obtain external
funding, which is denominated in foreign currency and subject to frictions. The present section
provides a detailed analysis of the entrepreneurs’ behaviour and their interactions with the
credit market.
103.1 Partial equilibrium contracting problem
The analysis of the debt contracting problem under asymmetric information developed in this
section closely follows Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). It is assumed the existence of a continuous
number of entrepreneurs indexed by j in the interval [0;1] producing a homogeneous capital
good. Each entrepreneur has the following stochastic linear technology,
Kj;t+1 = !j;tij;t; (16)
where Kj;t+1 indicates the capital good produced by entrepreneur j at period t; that will
be incorporated in the production process of intermediate ￿rms in period t+1; ij;t denotes the
input utilised by entrepreneur j to produce the capital good, which is part of the ￿nal good
produced in the economy; !j;t is a iid random variable with a common distribution across j;
where the cumulative and density functions have positive supports and are denoted by ￿(￿)
and ￿(￿); respectively. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that E(!) = 1:




j;t+1 = Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t); (17)
where StB￿
j;t+1 indicates the domestic value of the foreign currency denominated debt13
contracted at period t to be repaid at period t+1 and nj;t is the net worth of entrepreneur j at
the beginning of period t. This constraint simply indicates that the entrepreneur can purchase
inputs beyond his or her net worth only by contracting foreign currency denominated debt.
Following Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) among others, the model assumes
a costly state veri￿cation problem. In this context, the optimal contract between the borrower
and the lender will take the form of a standard non-contingent debt contract. To simplify
the model it will be assumed that there is enough anonymity in the credit market, so as to
avoid issues related to how past records of interactions between entrepreneurs and lenders
may a￿ect the characteristics of the ￿nancial contract.
The contract speci￿es a ￿xed payment to the lender in all states where the project gener-
ates a nominal gross return above the ￿xed nominal value of the debt repayment. In contrast,
when this condition is not satis￿ed, the entrepreneur defaults on the debt and the lender
recoups as much as he or she can from the project, after paying a ￿xed monitoring cost.
13The fact that the entrepreneur can only obtain foreign currency denominated debt is taken as given in
the model. It can be thought that the reason behind this situation is the so-called \original sin problem" (see
Hausmann, 1999).
11The random variable !j;t; which can be thought of as a productivity parameter, is neither
observed by the entrepreneur nor by the lender ex-ante. For the entrepreneur, however, it
is costless to observe the ex-post value of !j;t. The lender, in contrast, must incur in a
monitoring cost to observe the true value of !j;t:
The monitoring cost is given by the payment of ￿ij;t units of the ￿nal capital good, where
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 114. The payment to observe !j;t, however, is only made in case the entrepreneur
defaults on the debt. It is clear now where the costly state veri￿cation problem arises in the
model: in order to observe the true realisation of !j;t; the lender must incur in a deterministic
pecuniary cost.
Let !j;t denote the minimum value of !j;t at which default does not occur and let Rnd
j;t+1 in-
dicate the non-default gross nominal interest rate charged on entrepreneur j when contracting
the debt at period t. Rnd









j;t+1Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t): (18)
Eq. 18 indicates that entrepreneur j, with the associated value for the productivity pa-
rameter given by !j;t; produces !j;tij;t units of the capital good that are afterwards rented
to ￿rms at the nominal rental price Rk
t+1: The term Rk
t+1!j;tij;t; therefore, represents the
minimum nominal gross return of the produced capital required to repay the principal and
interests on the debt, Rnd
j;t+1StB￿
j;t+1.










Eq. 19 gives a simple relation between Rnd
j;t+1 and !j;t: It is worth highlighting that Rk
t+1
is a market price, and as such it will be determined by the equilibrium conditions between
aggregate supply and aggregate demand for capital. The general price index, Pt, is also a
market price determined by equilibrium conditions in the market for goods. Therefore, from
the entrepreneur’s viewpoint, these variables are taken as given.
Also note that taking the net worth of entrepreneur j as given, the contractual problem
between the lender and the entrepreneur is fully speci￿ed either in terms of Rnd
j;t+1 and ij;t, or
14The assumption regarding the form of the monitoring cost implies that there is a ￿xed cost ￿ij;t, known
ex-ante by the lender, for observing the true realisation of the project. Note that this cost depends on the
scale of the investment ij;t; but it is independent of the ex-post realisation of !j;t: A slightly di￿erent approach
is taken in Bernanke et al (1999), where the monitoring cost is a fraction of the ex-post realisation of the
project. It is worth observing, however, that the main results of the model remain the same, independently
of the form in which monitoring costs are de￿ned.
12!j;t and ij;t (see Eq. 18). Since the contract in terms !j;t and ij;t is slightly easier to study,
in the remainder of the section the optimal contractual problem is analysed only in terms of
these two variables.
3.2 Expected pro￿ts
In determining the optimal contract it is assumed that both the entrepreneur and the lender
are risk neutral. Recalling that capital fully depreciates within the period, the net expected






ij;t!￿(!)d! ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]R
nd
j;t+1Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t);
where the ￿rst term indicates the expected gross income for producing the capital good
whenever !j;t > !j;t; while the second term shows the expected cost of the debt repayment in
case the entrepreneur repays the debt as established in the contract (i.e., whenever !j;t > !j;t).
The term [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)] thus indicates the probability that the entrepreneur repays the debt.
Observe that in case of default, or whenever !j;t < !j;t; the entrepreneur receives nothing,
and any remaining value of the project is completely seized by the lender.








!￿(!)d! ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]!j;tg
where f(!j;t) = f
1 Z
!j;t
!￿(!)d! ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]!j;tg indicates the expected share of the in-
vestment that the entrepreneur keeps when undertaking a successful project.









t+1￿ij;t￿(!j;t) + [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]R
nd
j;t+1Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t):




ij;t!￿(!)d! indicates the expected gross income generated by the
project that is seized by the lender whenever !j;t < !j;t and Rk
t+1￿ij;t￿(!j;t) denotes the
13expected payment of the monitoring cost15. Note that ￿(!j;t) indicates the probability that
entrepreneur j defaults on the debt. In the case in which !j;t > !j;t; on the other hand, the
entrepreneur repays the loan as established in the contract, and thus the lender expects to
receive [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]Rnd
j;t+1Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t):












!￿(!)d! ￿ ￿￿(!j;t) + [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]!j;t indicates the expected share of
the investment that the lender keeps from the project.
Considering the de￿nitions of f(!j;t) and g(!j;t) it is possible to show that f(!j;t) +
g(!j;t) = 1 ￿ ￿￿(!j;t)16: This fact implies that a fraction ￿￿(!j;t) of the total investment
made by entrepreneur j is expected to be lost owing to the presence of monitoring costs.
3.2.1 A note on the behaviour of f(!j;t) and g(!j;t)
Let us consider again the fraction of the investment that the entrepreneur and the lender keep
from the project f(!j;t) and g(!j;t); respectively. In Appendix B it is shown that f0(!j;t) =
￿[1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)] and that f00(!j;t) = ￿(!j;t); implying that f(!j;t) is a convex function of !j;t
(notice that monitoring costs, ￿; do not a￿ect f(!j;t)) : In particular, note that f0(!j;t) will
always be negative, unless !j;t takes the highest value for which ! is de￿ned, in which case
f0(!j;t) = 0. Therefore, for a given level of investment ij;t; entrepreneur’s expected pro￿ts,
Rk
t+1ij;tf(!j;t); do not increase in !j;t:
Regarding g(!j;t); in this Appendix it is also shown that g0(!j;t) = ￿￿￿(!j;t)+[1￿￿(!j;t)]
and that g00(!j;t) = ￿[￿
@￿(!j;t)
@!j;t + ￿(!j;t)]: Note that, without monitoring costs (i.e., whenever
￿ = 0), g(!j;t) is concave in !j;t and g0(!j;t) ￿ 017. When monitoring costs are introduced in
the model, there is an additional e￿ect on g(!j;t): It can be shown that g00(!j;t) < 0 but, for
15Recall that when the entrepreneur defaults on the debt, the lender must pay ￿ij;t units of the capital
good, which must therefore be priced at the rental price of capital Rk
t+1:







!￿(!)d! = 1 gives f(!j;t) + g(!j;t) = 1 ￿ ￿￿(!j;t).
17g0(!j;t) will always be positive unless !j;t takes the highest value for which ! is de￿ned, in which case
g0(!j;t) = 0.
14su￿ciently high values of !j;t; g0(!j;t) < 0 (i.e., whenever ￿￿(!j;t) > [1￿￿(!j;t)]). Therefore,
with monitoring costs g(!j;t) becomes a hump shaped concave function, with a maximum at
the value of !j;t for which ￿￿(!j;t) = [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]; call it !￿
j;t.
Observe that for a given ij;t; the behaviour of the lender’s expected pro￿ts, Rk
t+1ij;tg(!j;t),
depends on the the behaviour of g(!j;t): In particular, whenever !j;t < !￿
j;t a small rise in !j;t
must increase lender’s expected pro￿ts. To gain intuition on this result, note that a small rise
in !j;t has three e￿ects on lender’s expected pro￿ts: i. Increases the expected gross revenue
of what the lender would recoup when the entrepreneur defaults on the debt, ii. Increases the
expected monitoring costs and iii. Reduces the expected nominal value of the debt repayment.
Therefore, it must be true that the ￿rst e￿ect overcomes the second and third e￿ects when
g0(!j;t) > 0; so as to have that the lender’s expected pro￿ts increase in !j;t when !j;t < !￿
j;t.
3.3 Determining the optimal contract
The optimal debt contract will be determined by a pair of values of ij;t and !j;t that maximises
the entrepreneur’s expected pro￿ts, subject to the lender receiving at least the opportunity
cost of the loan.
In what follows, it is assumed that the entrepreneur’s participation constraint, given by
Rk
t+1ij;tf(!j;t) > Rt+1Ptnj;t; holds. This condition indicates that the gross nominal rate of




be greater than the gross nominal interest, Rt+1.
The lender’s participation constraint, in turn, is given by Rk
t+1ij;tg(!j;t) ￿ Rt+1Pt(ij;t￿nj;t);
indicating that the lender’s expected gross nominal rate of return,
Rk
t+1ij;tg(!j;t)
Pt(ij;t￿nj;t) ; must be at
least the opportunity cost of the loan, Rt+1. Assuming that there are a large number of
lenders in this economy, we can invoke arbitrage conditions so as to guarantee that the
lender’s participation constraint binds.







t+1ij;tg(!j;t) = Rt+1Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t):







0(!j;t)g = Rt+1Pt; (20)
and








It is worth observing that Eqs. 19, 20 and 21 constitute a system of three equations in
three unknowns (!j;t; Rnd
j;t+1 and ij;t), since nj;t; Pt; Rk
t+1; and Rt+1 are taken as given. In













Eq. 22 implies that, in equilibrium, the value of !j;t is the same for all entrepreneurs (and
thus it is denoted by !t). Using Eqs. 21 and 22 it is possible to rewrite the demand function








Observe that this expression indicates that the demand function for the input ij;t linearly
depends on the net worth of agent j; fact that facilitates aggregation. This result is a direct
consequence of the linear production function of capital and the linear monitoring technol-
ogy. Taking as given the net worth of entrepreneur j; moreover, Eq. 23 gives a positive
relation between the rental price of capital, Rk
t+1; and the investment demand, ij;t: Formally,
di￿erentiating this equation with respect to Rk

















] > 020; 21: (24)
Also notice that Eq. 20 can be now rewritten as,
R
k






19See Appendix B for details.




> 0 is that g0(!t) > 0: In Appendix C it is shown that this condition
must hold in order to satisfy the second order conditions of the entrepreneur’s maximisation problem when
! is uniformly distributed in the interval [0;2]. Moreover, the fact that in equilibrium g0(!t) > 0 can also be
determined by analysing the maximand and the constraint of the entrepreneur’s optimisation problem. To
see this: let g0(!t) < 0: From the constraint, this fact implies that @!t
@it < 0: Using this result, we can see from
the maximand that the entrepreneur can always increase the expected pro￿t by increasing investment (since
f0(!t) ￿ 0), fact that must not be true in equilibrium. In equilibrium, therefore, g0(!t) > 0.
21It is worth emphasizing the close link between the entrepreneur’s optimal contracting problem and the
modern literature on credit rationing. In particular, the fact that in equilibrium it must be true that g0(!t) > 0;
suggests that this model does not show \equilibrium credit rationing" in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Therefore, on the upward sloping part of g(!t); the lender may provide any extra funding required by the
entrepreneur at a higher interest rate Rnd
t+1; since lender’s expected pro￿ts increase in that region. In contrast,
whenever g0(!t) ￿ 0; any further increase in the interest rate, which is associated with a higher probability
of default of the entrepreneur, reduces lender’s expected pro￿ts thus giving place to a situation where credit
rationing holds.














This equation indicates that, in equilibrium, the non-default interest rate will be the same
for all entrepreneurs since it does not depend on any variable of entrepreneur j.
4 Aggregation and equilibrium conditions
4.1 Aggregate net worth and aggregate investment
A key variable of the model is given by the entrepreneur’s net worth. For simplicity, it will
be assumed that entrepreneurs have an in￿nite horizon and that each period they devote a
constant fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of their aggregate net pro￿ts to the consumption of the ￿nal good.
A slightly di￿erent approach is taken in Bernanke et al (1999), where entrepreneurs have a
￿xed probability of survival every period. As Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) point out, it can be
thought that those entrepreneurs who do not survive are \informed" at the beginning of the
period and thus they consume their end-of-period pro￿ts just an instant before dying. These
two alternative forms of modelling the evolution of entrepreneurs’ consumption and thereby
entrepreneurs’ net worth are essentially equivalent (Carlstrom and Fuerst 2001, p. 7).
Recall that Rk
t+1f(!j;t)ij;t denotes the expected net pro￿ts of entrepreneur j at period t:
Using the fact that in equilibrium !j;t = !t and summing over j; we can de￿ne the net expected
pro￿ts of the entrepreneurial sector as Rk
t+1f(!t)it; where it denotes aggregate investment
(de￿ned below). Recalling that f(!t) = 1 ￿ ￿￿(!t) ￿ g(!t), nominal aggregate net worth at
the beginning of period t + 1 can be de￿ned as,
Pt+1nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)R
k
t+1(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t) ￿ g(!t))it:
Notice that the lender’s constraint in the entrepreneur’s maximisation problem can be
written in the aggregate as Rk
t+1itg(!t) = Rt+1Pt(it ￿ nt). Using this expression and the
budget constraint of the entrepreneurial sector, StB￿
t+1 = Pt(it ￿ nt); we can rewrite the
above equation as follows,
Pt+1nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)fR
k
t+1(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t))it ￿ Rt+1StB
￿
t+1g: (27)
Aggregate consumption at period t + 1; Ce





t+1(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t))it ￿ Rt+1StB
￿
t+1g: (28)
17Considering Eqs. 27 and 28 lagged one period, the budget constraint of the entrepreneurial
sector at period t (i:e:; StB￿







t(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t￿1))it￿1 + StB
￿
t+1: (29)
Each period t, entrepreneurs invest Ptit to produce the capital good, consume PtCe
t of the
￿nal produced good and repays capital and interests of the debt contracted at period t ￿ 1;
RtSt￿1B￿
t
22: These expenditures are ￿nanced with the aggregate income obtained for renting
the produced capital good to ￿rms, Rk
t(1￿￿￿(!t￿1))it￿1
23; and by issuing new debt StB￿
t+1.
Aggregate investment can be obtained by summing over j the demand function for the













where the last term in this expression is derived from Eq. 25. Eq. 30 shows that it
linearly depends on nt, the aggregate net worth available at the beginning of period t. It
also indicates that, in equilibrium, aggregate investment at period t is determined by the
aggregate net worth in the same period scaled by the factor (1 ￿
f0(!t)g(!t)
f(!t)g0(!t)); which can be
thought of as a measure of the leverage ratio of the entrepreneurial sector as a whole.
Introducing Eqs. 25 and 30 into Eq. 27 it is possible to obtain,
Pt+1nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Rt+1f￿
f0(!t)
f(!t)g0(!t)
(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t))Ptnt ￿ StB
￿
t+1g: (31)






(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t))Ptnt ￿ StB
￿
t+1g: (32)
Eq. 31 de￿nes the evolution of aggregate net worth. It indicates that entrepreneurs
obtain in the aggregate the gross nominal return ￿
f0(!t)
f(!t)g0(!t)(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t))Rt+1 for investing
their aggregate net worth Ptnt to produce the capital good. They utilise this return to repay
the amount Rt+1StB￿
t+1 for the debt contracted at period t: The di￿erence between these two
￿ows multiplied by (1 ￿ ￿); the fraction of entrepreneurs’ net pro￿ts not consumed, de￿nes
aggregate net worth at the beginning of period t + 1:
22It is worth noting that, although each individual entrepreneur has to repay Rnd
j;tSt￿1B￿
j;t to lenders (when-
ever the debt is repaid as established in the contract), at the aggregate level lenders receive the opportunity
cost of the loan, RtSt￿1B￿
t :
23The fact that (1￿￿￿(!t￿1))it￿1 is equal to the supply of capital at period t is discussed in detail in the
next subsection.
18Finally, note that from the budget constraint of the entrepreneurial sector and Eq. 30 it







4.2 Aggregate supply of the capital good
From the previous section we know that a fraction ￿￿(!t) of the total investment made by
entrepreneur j at period t is expected to be lost owing to the presence of monitoring costs.
The expected aggregate supply of capital is hence de￿ned as,
K
s
t+1 = it(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t)) = (1 ￿
f0(!t)g(!t)
f(!t)g0(!t)
)(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t))nt; (34)
where the last equality is obtained from Eq. 30. The existence of asymmetric information
problems between lenders and entrepreneurs implies that the aggregate supply of capital,
Ks
t+1; is a fraction (1 ￿ ￿￿(!t)) of what would be supplied under perfect information (i.e.,
whenever ￿ = 0). Notice that, as Rk
t+1 increases Ks
t+1 is a￿ected by two e￿ects: i. Aggre-
gate investment increases, positively a￿ecting Ks
t+1 and ii. Expected monitoring costs rises,
negatively a￿ecting Ks
t+1: The ￿rst e￿ect, however, overcomes the second e￿ect. This fact is
formally assessed in the following remark:
Remark 1 The model with monitoring costs provides an upward sloping supply curve of
capital in the (Rk
t+1;Kt+1) space.




f(!t)g0(!t))(f(!t) + g(!t))nt: Since in equilibrium g0(!t) > 0; we know that it is an
increasing function of Rk
t+1: We also know that @!t
@Rk




t+1 > 0; it
is thus su￿cient to show that @
@!t(f(!t)￿
f0(!t)g(!t)







g0(!t) g; expression that must be positive to satisfy the second order
condition of the entrepreneur’s maximisation problem (see Appendix C).
4.3 Aggregate demand for the capital good
In this model only intermediate ￿rms demand the capital produced by entrepreneurs. Using
the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium each ￿rm i sets the same price for the produced
intermediate good (i.e., Pi;t = PN;t), Eq. 4 thus implies that Zi;t = Zt for all i: From Eq. 6,
















To de￿ne the equilibrium of the model it is still necessary to specify: i. Money market
equilibrium, ii. Goods market equilibrium, iii. Capital good market equilibrium, iv. Labour
market equilibrium, v. Intertemporal balance of trade equilibrium and vi. Credit market
equilibrium.
4.4.1 Money market equilibrium
Money market equilibrium is given by Eq. 13 under the assumption that aggregate supply
equals aggregate demand for real money balances.
4.4.2 Goods market equilibrium
To determine the equilibrium conditions in the goods market it is worth recalling that there
are two sectors in this economy: one tradable and one nontradable. Noting that the only
source of absorption of tradable output is given by the demand for tradable inputs by the
￿nal producer ￿rm, we can de￿ne the clearing market condition in the tradable sector as
follows,
PT;t(Y T ￿ XT;t) = TBt; (36)
where TBt denotes the trade balance at period t measured in terms of tradable goods.
As previously pointed out, in a symmetric equilibrium we have that Pi;t = PN;t and that
Zi;t = Zt for all i: Therefore, the production function of the nontradable intermediate ￿rm
becomes Zt = AtK￿
t L
1￿￿
t : Owing to the existence of imperfect competition in this sector, it
must be true that the aggregate income of intermediate ￿rms equates the payment of the two
factors of production plus any remaining pro￿ts or: PN;tZt = Rk
tKt + WtLt + ￿t:
Regarding the ￿nal producer ￿rm, recalling that in equilibrium the marginal cost of the


























T;t : Cost minimisation hence implies PtYt = PN;tZt + PT;tXT;t; and thus the demand
functions for the nontradable and tradable inputs are given by PN;tZt = ￿PtYt and PT;tXT;t =
(1 ￿ ￿)PtYt; respectively.
Finally, the clearing market condition for the ￿nal nontradable good implies,
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + it: (39)
4.4.3 Capital good market equilibrium
In equilibrium, the rental price of capital will adjust so as to equate aggregate supply and
aggregate demand for the capital good: Ks
t = Kd










where Kt is given by Eq. 34.
4.4.4 Labour market equilibrium






t )￿￿. Using Eq. 38 and the equilibrium condition Ls
t = Ld
t = Lt yields,






where Lt is given by Eq. 14.
4.4.5 Intertemporal balance of trade equilibrium
By adding the budget constraints of households, government and entrepreneurs we can obtain
the budget constraint of the economy as a whole (i.e., the balance of payment):
PtCt + PtC
e









t(1 ￿ ￿(!t￿1))it￿1 + WtLt + ￿t + StR
￿
tDt:
21Using the fact that Rk
t(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t￿1))it￿1 = Rk
tKt; PN;tZt = Rk
tKt + WtLt + ￿t and









Let Ft = Dt￿B￿
t and Ft+1 = Dt+1￿B￿
t+1 denote the net foreign assets accumulation by the
economy as a whole at period t and t+1; respectively, in foreign currency. The intertemporal
national budget constraint in domestic currency can thus be written as,
StFt+1 = TBt + StR
￿
tFt: (42)





































As usual, Eq. 43 simply states that any initial net foreign-currency indebtedness must be
equal to the present value of future trade balance surpluses, guaranteeing that the economy
is solvent from an intertemporal perspective.
4.4.6 Credit market equilibrium
By Walras’ law, equilibrium in the credit market is guaranteed whenever the remaining mar-
kets of the economy are in equilibrium. In this context, from the intertemporal national
budget constraint the credit market equilibrium condition becomes an identity given by:
StB
￿
t+1 ￿ St(Dt+1 ￿ Ft+1);
where the aggregate demand for credit (i.e., StB￿
t+1) is de￿ned in Eq. 33; while the
aggregate supply of credit is given by Dt+1 ￿ Ft+1: The overall amount of credit that is
available in the economy is thus provided by domestic households in the form of deposits
Dt+1; and by foreigners in the form of net foreign liabilities, ￿Ft+1:
225 Solving for the zero-in￿ation symmetric steady state
The steady state aggregate net worth can be derived from Eq. 31:
n[f(!)g
0(!) + (1 ￿ ￿)Rf
0(!)(f(!) + g(!))] = ￿b(1 ￿ ￿)Rf(!)g
0(!); (44)
where b ￿ SB￿






From these two equations it is possible to pin-down the steady state value of !: To see
that, notice that Eq. 12 evaluated at the zero-in￿ation steady state gives,
R
￿ = R = r = ￿
￿1; 24 (46)





= (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿1; (47)
from which the steady state value of ! is obtained. Entrepreneurial consumption therefore
takes the form: Ce = ￿
1￿￿n: This expression indicates that in the steady state a share ￿
1￿￿ of
entrepreneur’s aggregate net worth is devoted to consumption. We can now study the steady
state solution of the whole model. The analysis becomes simpler by de￿ning all variables in
real terms as follows: rk ￿ Rk
P ; Rnd ￿ rnd; pN ￿
PN
P ; s = pT ￿ S
P; w ￿ W
P ; m ￿ M
P ; b ￿ SB￿
P ;
tb ￿ TB
P ; and f ￿ SF
P . To facilitate the exposition the key endogenous variables of the model

















24It is important to highlight that we have also assumed that the risk-free gross nominal interest rate (R￿
t)








K = i(1 ￿ ￿￿(!t)) (52)



















￿Y = pNZ (57)


























s(Y T ￿ XT) = tb (63)
Y = C + C








= (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿1 (66)
￿f￿
￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1tb: (67)
5.1 Analysis of !; rk and rnd
Since ! is a random variable, solving the model analytically requires assuming a distribution
function for it. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that ! is uniformly
distributed in the interval [0;2]: Therefore, Eq. 66 yields (see Appendix D for details):
! = 2 +
￿￿
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿)
￿ !
￿: (68)
Note that for !￿ to be within the interval [0;2] it is further required that ￿ + ￿ > 1 and
that ￿2 ￿
￿￿
1￿(￿+￿) ￿ 0: From here onwards we will assume that these two conditions are
satis￿ed.
Notice that the parameters a￿ecting !￿ are only ￿; ￿ and ￿: Therefore, the steady state
solution of ! will not be a￿ected by those parameters associated with production functions
or preferences other than ￿. Also observe that to have g0(!￿) > 0 it is required that ￿ < 1,
condition that is satis￿ed since ￿ 2 (0;1)25:
It is possible to determine, therefore, that !￿ decreases with monitoring costs ￿ (and thus,
the probability of default decreases in ￿), while it increases in the subjective discount factor
￿ and in the fraction of expected pro￿ts devoted to entrepreneurs’ consumption, ￿:




￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)f(!
￿))
￿1 = ￿








Eq. 69 implies that rk￿ increases in ￿ if ￿ >
2(1￿￿)
2￿￿ : It is also possible to show that rk￿




1￿￿ : On the other hand, rk￿ will always increase in ￿.

























￿+￿￿1 when ! is uniformly distributed in the interval
[0;2] (see Appendix D).
25Notice the similarity between Eq. 69 and Eq. 70. Their levels, however, will di￿er
depending on the degree of credit market imperfections (i.e., the value of ￿). It is possible to





As it happened in the case of the rental rate of capital, rnd￿ unequivocally rises in ￿: Table 2,
below, summarises these results.
Table 2. Summary of comparative static analysis
E￿ect on Change in
￿ ￿ ￿
!￿ (-) (+) (+)
rk￿ (+) if ￿ >
2(1￿￿)








From this table it is possible to observe that the e￿ects of changes in ￿ and ￿ on rk￿
and rnd￿ depend on the values of the parameters ￿; ￿ and ￿. To give an illustration of this
comparative static exercise, therefore, a small scale calibration-type analysis is introduced.
We have to determine the baseline values of ￿; ￿ and ￿: Regarding ￿, following Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) it will be considered that monitoring costs are equivalent to bankruptcy
costs. In case of default, hence, the lender will have to incur in direct costs (e.g., legal costs)
but also indirect costs to seize the entrepreneur’s project. The latter costs can be associated
with those in which the lender must incur for having the entrepreneur’s assets idle while these
are being liquidated. Since we will explore the e￿ects of raising ￿ we initially start with a
relatively low value: ￿ = 0:12: This value is the same as in Bernanke et al (1999) but is below
of that considered in Carlstrom and Fuerst (￿ = 0:25). Regarding the subjective discount
factor, we initially set ￿ = 0:98:
Observe that having de￿ned ￿ and ￿; the value of ￿ is restricted. In fact, ￿ must be
determined so as to satisfy: ￿ + ￿ > 1 and ￿2 ￿
￿￿
1￿(￿+￿) ￿ 0: Notice that the second
restriction implies that ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿(1
2￿ ￿ 1): Since the share of expected pro￿ts consumed by
entrepreneurs is likely to be relatively low we set ￿ = 0:12: This value implies that, in the
steady state, entrepreneurs consume 12% of their net expected pro￿ts. Table 3 illustrates
the values of !, ￿(!) (i.e., the steady state probability of default); r; rk; rnd and the spreads
rk ￿ r and rnd ￿ r for the baseline parameters.
Table 3. The benchmark case
! ￿(!) r rk rnd rk ￿ r rnd ￿ r
0.82 0.41 1.02 1.11 1.39 0.09 0.37
26From Table 3 we can observe that ! is below the mean value of ! (￿ 1) in the benchmark
case. Therefore, we should expect a relatively low failure rate in this scenario. In fact, this
is the case since ￿(!) = 0:41: It is worth observing that the credit spread (or risk premium),
rnd ￿ r (= 0:37), is markedly above the excess return for investing in producing capital,
rk ￿ r (= 0:09). This fact is a direct consequence of the asymmetric information problem
assumed in the model. As it will be explained below, ￿ = 0:12 implies that the agency
problem is relatively low and therefore the supply of capital is relatively high in this case.
As a consequence of this, the real rental rate of capital, rk; is pushed at a level close to the
risk-free real interest rate, r: To understand this feature in more detail, we can study the
behaviour of the model when ￿ rises from 0:12 to 0:15 (see Table 4).
Table 4. A change in ￿ : from ￿ = 0:12 to ￿ = 0:15
In levels As % change wrt benchmark case
! ￿(!) r rk rnd rk ￿ r rnd ￿ r ￿ ! ￿(!) r rk rnd rk ￿ r rnd ￿ r
0.53 0.27 1.02 1.13 1.29 0.11 0.27 25 -35.7 -35.7 0 1.1 -7.4 13.2 -27.8
From Table 4 we can observe that the rise in ￿ raises rk: A rise in monitoring costs hence
implies a higher steady state return on capital, rk. To understand this, note that there is a
direct e￿ect of ￿ on the total supply of capital. Taking the level of aggregate investment i
and of ! as given, Eq. 52 shows that the aggregate supply of capital must fall after the shock.
A shortage in the supply of capital is thus associated with a higher rental price rk (see Eq.
51). Everything else equal, an increase in rk reduces the probability that the entrepreneur
defaults on the debt ￿(!), and therefore ! and rnd decreases. Notice that, in this model,
economies with a more developed ￿nancial system are associated with a lower value of ￿; and
thus a higher steady state supply of capital. Therefore, the excess return rk￿r brings a direct
measure of the degree of imperfections in ￿nancial markets.
As a second exercise, we consider an increase in ￿ from 0:98 to 0:99: As a direct consequence
of this shock there is a reduction in the steady state level of the risk-free gross real interest
rate (from 1:02 to 1:01). Everything else equal, there is a direct e￿ect on rk from Eq. 50, thus
implying that rk must fall. The reduction in rk is thus associated with a higher probability
of default of the entrepreneur and therefore ! and rnd must rise (see Table 5).
Table 5. A change in ￿ : from ￿ = 0:98 to ￿ = 0:99
In levels As % change wrt benchmark case
! ￿(!) r rk rnd rk ￿ r rnd ￿ r ￿ ! ￿(!) r rk rnd rk ￿ r rnd ￿ r
0.92 0.46 1.01 1.11 1.42 0.1 0.41 1 11.7 11.7 -1 -0.7 2.3 2.7 11.6
27The ￿nal exercise stresses the e￿ect of an increase in ￿ from 0:12 to 0:15: This shock
implies that entrepreneurs devote a higher fraction of their expected pro￿ts to consumption.
Everything else equal, there is a direct negative e￿ect on the aggregate steady state net
worth. The reduction in net worth implies that entrepreneurs are riskier in the steady state
and therefore ￿(!); ! and rnd must be at a higher level. Notice that the fall in net worth
has an indirect negative e￿ect on the aggregate investment and thus on the aggregate capital
supply. This reduction in the steady state aggregate capital supply thus implies that the
rental price of capital, rk; must be located at a higher level (see Table 6). This latter e￿ect
diminishes although does not o￿set completely the initial increase in ￿(!):
Table 6. A change in ￿ : from ￿ = 0:12 to ￿ = 0:15
In levels As % change wrt benchmark case
! ￿(!) r rk rnd rk ￿ r rnd ￿ r ￿ ! ￿(!) r rk rnd rk ￿ r rnd ￿ r
1.10 0.55 1.02 1.12 1.53 0.1 0.51 25 32.9 32.9 0 0.9 10.2 10.6 38.3
5.2 Analysis of the remaining steady state variables of the model
In this subsection the solutions of the remaining variables for the steady state are obtained
analytically. Notice that unless we assume zero steady state net foreign assets it is not possible
to ￿nd closed-form solutions. For brevity, we discuss the steady state solutions of the model
under the assumption that f = 0: This assumption of often considered in the new open
economy macroeconomics literature (see, for instance, Obstfeld and Rogo￿, 1996). From Eqs.
58, 63 and 67 we thus have that XT = Y T and thus s = Y (1 ￿ ￿)Y
￿1
T : Notice that from the
steady state solution of ! (￿ !￿) we can derive the associated steady state values of f(!￿)
and g(!￿): In Appendix E we show that output, consumption and net worth are given by:










































From the above solutions it is possible to undertake some exercises of comparative statics.
It is interesting, in particular, to notice that a rise in Y T raises Y; C and n but has a negative
28e￿ect on the steady state real exchange rate, s: At the steady state level, we can thus observe
some sort of "Dutch disease" phenomenon: a sudden expansion in the tradable sector is spread
in the economy hence expanding nontradable output and consumption, but also gives place
to a more appreciated real exchange rate in the long-run.
Table 7, below, shows a subset of the key endogenous variables of the model relative to
K26: In order to illustrate the di￿erences between the case with and without credit market
imperfections, we also compute the steady state solutions when ￿ = 0:
Table 7. Steady state solutions of the main real variables of the model






















Without asymmetric information problems (i.e., when ￿ = 0); it can be easily seen that
f(!￿) = 0 and that g(!￿) = 127: This case becomes a fairly standard RBC model, similar to
that developed, for instance, in McCallum (1989)28,29. Since we have assumed that capital
fully depreciates within the period, when ￿ = 0 investment i and the capital stock K coincide,
as we would expect: i=K = 1. With asymmetric information, since a fraction of investment
is lost owing to the presence of agency costs, we have that i=K > 1.
Notice also that, although the steady state level of output is higher in the RBC case, the
ratio Y=K is lower compared to that obtained with agency costs (see Table 7). This fact is
a direct consequence of the relatively higher increase in K; compared to Y; that is obtained
when monitoring costs are eliminated.
An interesting feature of the RBC case is the fact that as ￿ ! 0; n ! 0: From Eq. 61 we
can also observe that Ce ! 0; implying that entrepreneurs’ consumption must also be zero.
26Notice that Table 7 will be exactly the same whether we assume that f = 0 or not.
27Notice that when ￿ = 0; !￿ = 2: From Appendix D, this fact implies that f(!￿) = 0 and therefore
g(!￿) = 1:
28For the case in which McCallum assumes full capital depreciation, a Cobb-Douglas production function
and logarithmic preferences.
29It should be noted, however, that other relevant di￿erences between these models remain. McCallum
considers a closed-economy model, with ￿exible prices and without money. However, the assumption previ-
ously made that f ￿ 0 and that the nominal price rigidity only lasts one period imply that the steady state
solutions of the two models do not di￿er for these reasons. Both solutions di￿er, nevertheless, since McCallum
assumes perfectly competitive sectors. In the present paper we are considering that intermediate nontradable
￿rms face monopolistic competition. This fact indeed yields slightly di￿erent steady state solutions.
29Although this observation is pointed out in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, p. 12), they do not
discuss the issue in depth.
Remark 2 Without asymmetric information problems entrepreneurs disappear as a di￿eren-
tiated class from households. Without credit constraints there is no need for accumulation of
net worth. The supply of capital in the economy is thus directly provided by households in the
form of savings for future consumption; and thus can be interpreted as a one to one linear
transformation from savings: b ￿ K = i = Y ￿ C:
Since the real amount of debt b and the stock of capital K coincide in the RBC case, we
have b=K = 1 and n
K = 0 as shown in Table 7.
6 Dynamics
To study the dynamics of the model it is useful to take advantage of the dichotomy which
exists between the monetary and the real side of the economy, due to the assumed households’
logarithmic preferences. A similar approach for solving their respective models is taken, for
instance, in Benassy (1995) and in Fender and Rankin (2003).
Since this model is highly non-linear, however, we will analyse its dynamic properties
undertaking a linear approximation of it about the zero-in￿ation steady state. With a num-
ber a few exceptions, a lower-case variable denotes a percentage deviation of the original







; where Xss is the initial steady state value of Xt
31: We now start
analysing the linear approximation of those variables associated with the monetary side of
the model.
xt ￿ mt ￿ pt ￿ ct (74)





30Since we previously used lower-case notations for !t; nt and it their linear approximations are de￿ned as:
b !t ￿ !t￿!
￿
!￿ ; b nt ￿ nt￿n
ss
nss and b it ￿ it￿i
ss
iss ; respectively:
31A convenient way for obtaining log-deviations is proposed in Uhlig (1999). For any variable Xt we can





￿1xt ￿ ht (77)
st+1 ￿ st = rt+1: (78)
De￿ning the demand for real money balances per unit of consumption as Xt (￿ Mt
PtCt) and
the inverse of the (gross) growth rate of money supply between t+1 and t as Ht (￿ Mt
Mt+1); it
is easy to see that Eqs. 74 and 75 are log-linear versions of these two equations. Substituting
the Euler equation for consumption (i.e., Eq. 12), and the UIP condition in the demand for
money equation derived in Eq. 13 and linearising about the zero-in￿ation steady state gives
Eq. 76. From the Euler equation, the UIP condition and Eqs. 75-76 it is possible to obtain
Eq. 77. It is easy to see that the log-linear version of the UIP condition yields Eq. 7832.
The solution of the model becomes easier by ￿rstly solving Eq. 77, which is a ￿rst order
linear di￿erence equation in the forward-looking variable xt: Since ￿ < 1; this di￿erence
equation is unstable in its forward dynamics. Assuming that ht is constant over time (i.e.,
ht = h 8 t), saddle point stability thus requires that xt immediately jumps to the steady state
value h
￿￿1￿1:
Since the economic policy exercise in which we are interested is a permanent and unantic-
ipated change in the log-deviation of the money supply at time t, we further have that h = 0
(i.e., mt = mt+1 ￿ m)33. In this case, therefore, xt jumps immediately after the shock to its
new steady state value (= 0).
Notice that Eq. 74 implies that ct = m ￿ pt; and thus consumption and real money
balances move together over time. From Eq. 76 we also have that rt+1 = 0 and hence Eq.
78 gives st = st+1 ￿ s: This is an important implication of the model since it embeds the
fact that the exchange rate immediately jumps to its new steady state value after the shock.
This model does not show, therefore, non-trivial exchange rate dynamics as in the case of the
well-known overshooting model of Dornbusch (1976).
It is worth highlighting that this dichotomy between the monetary and the real side of the
model is not complete since s is an endogenous variable and we still have to solve for it. To
do that, it will be necessary to consider the real side of the model, the direction in which we
are now moving.
32Recall the assumption that R￿
t is constant over time.
33Observe that m can be thought as the percentage deviation of the new steady state level of the money




31To facilitate the exposition, below is presented a list with the key variables of the model,
where we have made use of the results previously obtained for the monetary sector.
ct+1 = pt ￿ pt+1 + ct (79)
ct = m ￿ pt (80)
zt = at + ￿kt + (1 ￿ ￿)lt (81)
yt = ￿zt + (1 ￿ ￿)xT;t (82)
yT;t = 0 (83)
xT;t = yt ￿ (s ￿ pt) (84)
zt = yt ￿ (pN;t ￿ pt) (85)
pt = (1 ￿ ￿)s + ￿pN;t (86)
pN;t = ￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)wt + ￿r
k
t (87)
b it = ￿1b nt + ￿2bt+1 (88)
b !t = ￿6b nt ￿ ￿6bt+1 (89)
r
k
t+1 ￿ pt = ￿1bt+1 ￿ ￿1b nt + ￿3b !t (90)
b nt+1 = c
e
t+1 = bt+1 ￿ (pt+1 ￿ pt) + ￿4b !t (91)
kt+1 = ￿￿5b !t + ￿1b nt + ￿2bt+1 (92)
32r
k
t ￿ pN;t = zt ￿ kt (93)
wt ￿ pN;t = zt ￿ lt (94)
lt = wt ￿ pt ￿ ct (95)
yt = ￿7ct + ￿8c
e
t + ￿9b it (96)








￿1 ￿ (1 +
￿g(!￿)
(1￿￿)f(!￿))￿1; ￿1=￿=0 ￿ 0
￿2 ￿ (1 +
(1￿￿)f(!￿)




g(!￿) ￿ 1; ￿3=￿=0 ￿ 0
￿4 ￿ 1
4(!￿)2(g(!￿)￿1 + f(!￿)￿1) ￿ f(!￿)￿1; ￿4=￿=0 ! ￿1








; ￿6=￿=0 ￿ 0
￿7 ￿ C
Y = 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿1
￿
f(!￿)+￿g(!￿)
f(!￿)+g(!￿) ; ￿7=￿=0 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿1
￿
￿8 ￿ Ce
Y = ￿￿￿ ￿￿1
￿ (1 +
g(!￿)
f(!￿))￿1; ￿8=￿=0 ￿ 0
￿9 ￿ i
Y = ￿￿ ￿￿1
￿
f(!￿)(1￿￿)+￿g(!￿)
f(!￿)+g(!￿) ; ￿9=￿=0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿1
￿ :
Eq. 79 is derived from the Euler equation for consumption, where we have considered the
fact that rt+1 = 0: Eq. 74 is rewritten in Eq. 80 for the case in which xt = 0: The supply side
of the model is described in Eqs. 81-83. The log-linear production function of intermediate
￿rms is de￿ned in Eq. 81, while that of the ￿nal producer ￿rm is given by Eq. 82. The
log-linear expression for the tradable output, which is equal to zero owing to the assumption
that its supply is exogenous and constant over time, is given by Eq. 83.
Eqs. 84 and 85 are log-linear versions of the input demand functions of the ￿nal producer
￿rm. We have used the fact that the LOOP holds in this model and thus pT;t = s: The
33linearised price index of the economy is represented by Eq. 86; while that of nontradable
goods is given by Eq. 87.
The presence of credit market imperfections is essentially re￿ected in Eqs. 88-92. The
linear approximation of aggregate investment (i.e., Eq. 30), is given by Eq. 8834, where
we have used the following de￿nition bt+1 ￿ b￿
t+1 + s ￿ pt. Similarly, Eq. 89 is the linear
approximation of the aggregate demand for credit equation de￿ned in Eq. 33. Eqs. 90-92
are linear approximations of Eqs. 25, 31, 32 and 34, respectively, considering Eq. 33. It is
worth observing that since entrepreneur’s net worth and consumption are constant fractions
of expected pro￿ts ((1 ￿ ￿) and ￿; respectively), the log-deviation of these variables is the
same. Eqs. 93-95 are log-linear versions of Eqs. 40, 41 and 14, respectively. Eqs. 96 and 97
are linear approximations of the clearing market conditions for the nontradable and tradable
sector.
To facilitate studying the analytics of the model, we approximate the trade balance about
an initial steady state in which the trade balance is zero. In this steady state, therefore,
net foreign assets are also zero. We thus de￿ne ￿t (￿ TBt
SY T ) as the absolute deviation of the
trade balance at period t de￿ated by the value of tradable output evaluated at that initial
steady state (i.e., before the change in the money supply). The linear approximation of the
intertemporal national budget constraint de￿ned in Eq. 43 is given by Eq. 98. For further
reference, we also de￿ne f￿1f￿
S0F0
P0 =( S
PY T)g as the absolute deviation of (inherited) net
foreign assets in real terms de￿ated by the real value of domestic output evaluated at the
initial steady state. Observe that F0 is given from the previous history of the model. In
contrast, the real exchange rate
S0
P0 can be a￿ected by current shocks. When setting F0 = 0
Eq. 98 takes the form: 0 =
P1
t=0 ￿
t￿t: The parameters ￿i; i = 1;:::;9; are complicated
functions of the structural parameters of the model. For future comparisons we also include
the values for the case in which asymmetric information problems are absent (i.e., ￿ = 0),
which we denote as ￿i=￿=0; i = 1;:::;9: Notice that ￿4=￿=0 ! ￿1; implying that net worth is
not well de￿ned in such case. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the steady state
level of net worth is zero when ￿ = 0:
6.1 Dynamics without credit market imperfections
Without loss of generality it is assumed that at = 0 8 t: Let e ￿ s ￿ m denote the di￿erence
between the steady state level of the exchange rate and the money supply, respectively. From
Appendix F it can be seen that Eqs. 79-96 can be reduced to the following system of linear




























































This representation takes the value of the endogenous variable s as given. This variable,
however, is not a￿ecting the matrix of coe￿cients in the above system and thus will not a￿ect
the speed of convergence to the new steady state after the shock. Once the solutions of kt
and ct are obtained, we can solve for s considering Eqs. 97 and 98. Notice that at each period
t the stock of capital kt is a predetermined variable, while ct is a non-predetermined or jump
variable. In particular, at t = 0; k0 is also given by the previous history of the model.
To satisfy the saddle point property of the model it is required that the matrix of coe￿-
cients of Eq. 99 has one root inside and one root outside the unit circle. In the present case
the two roots are given by ￿1 = ￿￿ < 1 and ￿2 = ￿
￿￿1
1
￿￿￿ > 1; and hence the saddle point



















As usual, the constant associated with the unstable root is set to zero so as to eliminate
any explosive path. To determine ￿1 we consider the fact that kt is a predetermined variable,
thus yielding: ￿1 = (k0 ￿
1￿￿
￿￿￿1e). The system described in Eq. 100 hence gives the solutions
of kt and ct conditional on s: It is now possible to solve for this remaining variable. From







￿ e; which is equal to zero after
substituting for the solutions of kt and ct: Therefore, with ￿ = 0 labour is una￿ected by the
change in the money supply under ￿exible prices35. The linearised version of the demand for
the tradable input can therefore be written as: xT;t = ￿kt + ￿￿￿1(e + ct) (see Appendix F).
Substituting for kt and ct we ￿nally arrive at:
xT;t = ￿e = ￿(s ￿ m):
Without nominal price rigidities and assuming zero initial net foreign assets (i.e., F0 = 0);
Eqs. 97 and 98 give 0 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿t: This implies that ￿t = 0; and therefore s = m: In this
case, the increase in the money supply does not have current account e￿ects, and therefore
35When considering one-period nominal price rigidities at period t = 0, however, labour will be a￿ected by
the change in the money supply during that period. From t = 1 onwards, when prices are fully ￿exible, the
fact that lt = 0 8t ￿ 1 is again recovered.
35money is neutral in the long-run. This result is modi￿ed when introducing nominal price
rigidities, as shown below.
6.1.1 Analysis including short-run dynamics
The case in which intermediate nontradable ￿rms do not adjust prices at period t = 0 adds
interesting dynamics into the analysis. In what follows, the subindex 0 indicates the short-
run value of any given variable (i.e., while prices of intermediate nontradable goods are un-
changed). In this case we have that p0 = (1 ￿ ￿)s; implying that c0 = m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)s: It
can be seen that the demand for the tradable input takes the form: xT;0 = y0 ￿ ￿s: Let
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿1
￿ (< 1): The clearing market condition for nontradable goods can thus be written
as: y0 = (1￿￿)fm￿(1￿￿)sg+￿k1 (sinceb i0 = k1 under the assumption of full capital depre-
ciation). Immediately arises the fact that the evolution of the capital stock gives persistence
to the initial shock. From Eq. 100, we have that k1 = fk0 ￿
1￿￿
￿￿￿1(s ￿ m)g￿￿ +
1￿￿
￿￿￿1(s ￿ m):
After some manipulations the demand for tradable inputs at period t = 0 takes the form:
xT;0 = m(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ s + ￿￿￿k0 = ￿￿0: (101)
Since prices are fully ￿exible 8t ￿ 1 we also have that,
xT;t = ￿e = ￿(s ￿ m) = ￿￿t;8t ￿ 1:
The trade balance is hence divided in two di￿erentiated phases. There is a short-run
trade balance that lasts only one period, when prices of intermediate nontradable goods are
unchanged. The second phase is characterised by price ￿exibility and holds 8t 2 1:::1: The
national intertemporal budget constraint stated in Eq. 98 has to be analysed accordingly.
Assuming that the system is in the steady state before the shock, we have that k0 = 0. Eq.
98 gives,
s = m ￿ ff￿1
1 ￿ ￿
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿mg: (102)
With the solution of s at hand, we can now recover the solutions of the other variables
of the model. Notice that that e = ￿ff￿1
1￿￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿mg: For comparability with the
model developed in Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (1996, Ch. 10.2) we further assume a zero initial net
assets position (i.e., f￿1 = 0). It is thus possible to show that the trade balance surplus in
the short- and long-run is given by:
￿0 = ￿￿￿m = ￿xT;0;
36and
￿t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿m = ￿xT;t; 8 t ￿ 1:
Therefore, the increase in the money supply improves the trade balance surplus on impact.
Recalling that tradable output is exogenous and constant over time, it is easy to see then that
the improvement in the trade balance surplus is driven by the reduction in the demand for
tradable inputs. This fact is a direct consequence of the reduction in the relative price of
nontradable inputs. There is therefore a boom in that sector, whose output is given by:
z0 = m(1 ￿ ￿￿): Notice also that since the stock of capital is zero at t = 0; the rise in the





The steady state trade balance is reached at t = 1: Notice that from this period onwards the
positive wealth e￿ect generated on impact (i.e., there is an accumulation of net foreign assets)
allows the country to reduce future trade balance surpluses. Therefore, in this framework,
we have the result that money is not neutral in the long-run. Setting ￿ = 0 (i.e., the model
without capital), recovers the long-run neutrality of money. In this case there are no current
account imbalances and ￿0 = ￿t = 0 8 t ￿ 1; bringing similar results as those obtained in
Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (1996, Ch. 10.2); where labour is the only input utilised in production.
Remark 3 The introduction of capital in the model in combination with one-period nominal
price rigidities bring the result that money is not neutral in the long-run. The unexpected and
permanent increase in the money supply a￿ects the current account on impact, giving place
to an accumulation of net foreign assets. This wealth e￿ect is thus the source of the long-run
non-neutrality of money.
The accumulation of net foreign assets also a￿ects the new steady state level of the re-
maining endogenous variables. To explain this, observe that the short- and long-run solutions







t)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿m;8t ￿ 1:
36Interestingly, it can be shown that neither z0 nor l0 are a￿ected by f￿1 in the more general case in which
f￿1 6= 0:
37Although k0 = 0; the monetary shock has e￿ects on the evolution of capital from period
t = 1 onwards. The supply of capital increases over time until the new steady state is reached.
A similar result is also observed in the case of the ￿nal nontradable good, whose solutions for
the short- and long-run are stated below:
y0 = ￿mf(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿g;
and
yt = (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ (￿￿)t+1
1 ￿ ￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿m; 8 t ￿ 1:
We can observe that there is a short- and long-run positive impact on output. As previ-
ously mentioned, the production of nontradable intermediate inputs is demand-determined in
t = 0; boosted by the positive e￿ect of m on y0: Although labour increases at period t = 0; for
t ￿ 1 we have shown that lt = 0: This fact will negatively a￿ect y1 compared to y0: However,
the increase in the supply of capital from t = 1 pushes up output. Consumption, not discussed
here, is also positively a￿ected by the monetary shock. Finally, it is worth highlighting that
although the nominal exchange rate immediately jumps to its new steady state value, the real
exchange rate shows interesting non-trivial dynamics. Owing to the assumption that prices
of nontradable goods do not adjust at t = 0; there is a sort of short-run overshooting in the
real exchange rate. Simple computations show that at period t = 0 this is given by,
s ￿ p0 = ￿s = ￿mf1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿g:
Hence, the real exchange rate depreciates in the short-run. For t ￿ 1 we have,
s ￿ pt = ￿(
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿)t+1
(1 ￿ ￿￿)
)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿m:
Clearly, the real exchange rate becomes more appreciated in the new steady state after the
shock. This e￿ect is consistent with the accumulation of net foreign assets at period t = 0:
Notice that the increase in the domestic price level at period t = 1, due to the rise in prices
of nontradable goods, is one of the main source of this real appreciation. The positive wealth
a￿ect given by the accumulation of net foreign assets also increases aggregate demand, thus
pushing up the price level. This further contributes to appreciate the real exchange rate.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 sketches the impulse-response functions of the variables
discussed previously.
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Figure 2. Impulse-response functions.
6.2 Dynamics with credit market imperfections (under current re-
search)
From Appendix F it can also be shown that Eqs. 79-96 give a linear system in the endogenous
variables kt+1; b nt+1 and ct+1: It is worth noting that when credit market imperfections are
introduced into the model the stock of capital kt and net worth b nt become the predetermined
variables at each period t. In particular, at t = 0; k0 and b n0 are given. Consumption ct; again,
is the non-predetermined or jump variable. The introduction of credit market imperfections
therefore adds an additional state variable into the analysis, expanding the dynamic behaviour
of the model. Since the coe￿cients of the system are highly nonlinear, verifying that the saddle
point property is satis￿ed requires some sort of calibration-type exercise. Preliminary results
show that this is the case37. Moreover, it can be also demonstrated that lt is now a￿ected even
with ￿exible prices for all t 2 0;:::1. As a consequence of this, the trade balance does not
reach the steady state at period t = 1 (as it was the case without credit market imperfections).
37Setting ￿ = 0:12; ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:33, ￿ = 0:7; ￿ = 10 and ￿ = 0:12 we have been able to prove that
the matrix of coe￿cients of the system of di￿erence equations has the following roots: 0:23; 0:94; and 5:01.
Therefore, there are two roots inside and one root outside the unit circle; and hence the saddle point property
is satis￿ed.
397 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a fully microfounded two sectors small open economy model with im-
perfect competition in the intermediate nontradable sector, in￿nitely lived agents, currency
mismatches in the denomination of assets and liabilities and imperfect credit markets.
The economic policy exercise considered here is an unexpected and permanent increase in
the level of the money supply under a ￿oating exchange rate regime. It was shown that the
nominal exchange rate does not show non-trivial dynamics as in the Dornbusch (1976) well
known overshooting model.
When studying the dynamic properties of the model without credit market imperfections,
it was demonstrated that the long-run neutrality of money is not satis￿ed due to the accu-
mulation of net foreign assets in the period of the shock. It was also shown that the currency
depreciation is expansionary as in the Mundell-Fleming textbook model. When considering
credit market imperfections entrepreneurs’ net worth is included as an additional state vari-
able into the model, thus a￿ecting the dynamic behaviour of the system. It remains to be
answered, therefore, whether credit market imperfections can explain contractionary depreci-
ations or not. Another important aspect of the model that could modify these results is the
assumption of zero initial net foreign assets. If the currency depreciation takes place in an
economy with initial net foreign liabilities, it might be the case that the real value of these
liabilities rises with the exchange rate; thus generating negative wealth e￿ects that might
overcome the positive expenditure-switching e￿ects of the currency depreciation on output.
A natural extension of the paper will be to study the model under a ￿xed exchange rate
regime. Welfare comparisons can also be introduced in a future stage of this research.
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t+1ij;tg(!j;t) ￿ Rt+1Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t)]; (AA1)






















t+1ij;tg(!j;t) ￿ Rt+1Pt(ij;t ￿ nj;t) = 0: (AA4)
Note that Eq. AA3 implies ￿ = ￿
f0(!j;t)
g0(!j;t): Replacing this expression in Eq. AA2 and
rearranging gives Eq. 20. Solving Eq. AA4 for ij;t gives Eq. 21.
Appendix B
From the main text we have: f(!j;t) =
1 Z
!j;t
!￿(!)d! ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]!j;t: Observe that










!￿(!)d! = 1; we can obtain,
f(!j;t) = 1 ￿
!j;t Z
0
!￿(!)d! ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]!j;t:
Taking derivatives with respect to !j;t gives,
f
0(!j;t) = ￿[1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]; (AB1)
and
f
00(!j;t) = ￿(!j;t); (AB2)
41implying that f(!j;t) is a convex function of !j;t:




!￿(!)d! ￿ ￿￿(!j;t) + [1 ￿ ￿(!j;t)]!j;t:
Taking derivatives with respect to !j;t gives,
g







Let us now consider the ￿rst order condition stated in Eq. 20: After rearranging terms,


























considering the second order conditions of the entrepreneur’s maximisation problem (see
Appendix C) and the fact that in equilibrium g0(!j;t) > 0: This implies that
@!j;t
@Rk
t+1 > 0; as
explained in the main text.
Appendix C
To obtain the second order conditions we also need the following partial derivatives of the


















































t+1g(!j;t) ￿ Rt+1Pt Rk
t+1ij;tg0(!j;t)
Rk






To satisfy the associated second order condition for a maximum, we need the determinant
of the matrix H to be greater or equal to zero (see, for instance, Simon and Blume 1994, p.










t+1g(!j;t) ￿ Rt+1Pt]2 ￿ 0; to satisfy the second order condition it is needed that
[f00(!j;t) ￿
f0(!j;t)
g0(!j;t)g00(!j;t)] ￿ 0: Whenever ! is uniformly distributed in the interval [0;2]; the




2(!+￿) (see Appendix D). For this inequality
to be satis￿ed, we further require that g0(!) = 1￿ 1
2(!+￿) > 0 (or that ￿ < 2￿!). Moreover,
providing that ￿ > 0 the second order condition is satis￿ed as an strict inequality.
Appendix D
In this appendix we consider the particular case in which ! is uniformly distributed in the
interval [0;2]; therefore the mean of ! is 1; as stated in the main text. The following results
immediately follows: ￿(!) = 1
2;
@￿(!)
@! = 0; ￿(!) = 1
2! and 1￿ ￿(!) = 1 ￿ 1
2!: Using the























2 ￿ ! + 1;
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In this appendix it is shown how to obtain the steady state solutions of the main endoge-
nous variables of the model. Recalling that s = Y (1 ￿ ￿)Y
￿1
T ; from Eq. 59 it is possible to
obtain,






This equation, however, does not pin-down Y since pN is an endogenous variable. To solve
for pN note that the equilibrium condition in the labour market, described by Eqs. 53 and
54, in conjunction with Eq. 57 bring the relation,


















































This equation gives a relation between two endogenous variables: C and Y: The clearing
market condition for the nontradable good, Eq. 64, in combination with Eqs. 61, 62 and 66
also give,






























44after substituting for C. Observe that Eq. AE2 relates two endogenous variables: n and
Y:
We can obtain a second expression in these two variables as follows. The production





Notice that L1￿￿pN = A￿1( ￿
￿￿1
rk￿
￿ )￿(￿Y )1￿￿ (from Eqs. 54, 60 and AE1). Also observe
that rk￿K = (1 ￿ ￿)￿1(1 +
g(!￿)
f(!￿))n (from Eqs. 50, 52, 62 and 66).
Therefore, it is possible to obtain,
n = Y ￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿





Substituting Eq. AE3 into Eq. AE2 and rearranging gives the solution for Y;






























Having solved for Y we can now obtain the steady state solutions of all the remaining
endogenous variables of the model.
Appendix F
This appendix explains how to derive the minimum state-space system described in Eq.
99. Without loss of generality it is assumed that at = 0 8 t: Let e ￿ s￿m denote the di￿erence
between the steady state level of the exchange rate and the money supply, respectively. To
express the system in terms of the endogenous variables kt+1; b nt+1 and ct+1; as a ￿rst order
linear system of di￿erence equations, it is necessary to ￿rstly obtain the following intermediate
results: (i) pt+1 ￿ pt as a function of kt+1; ct+1; ct; b nt and e; (ii) ct+1 as a function of kt+1; ct;
b nt and e; (iii) b nt+1 as a function of kt+1; ct+1; ct; b nt and e; (iv) kt+1 as a function of kt; b nt; ct;
e and (v) ct+1 and b nt+1 as a function of kt; b nt; ct; e: In what follows, we explain in detail how
to obtain each of these results.
(i) From Eqs. 80, 81, 82 and 84 it is possible to write xT;t as:
xT;t = ￿kt + (1 ￿ ￿)lt ￿ ￿
￿1(e + ct): (AF1)
Substituting Eqs. 81, 82 and AF1 into Eq. 85 gives:
















Eqs. 87, 90 and AF3, in turn, bring:
pN;t+1 ￿ pt =
1 ￿ ￿
2
(ct + kt+1) +
1 + ￿
2
(￿1bt+1 ￿ ￿1b nt + ￿3b !t): (AF4)
Substituting Eq. AF2 into Eq. AF4 yields,









(ct + kt+1) +
1 + ￿
2
(￿1bt+1 ￿ ￿1b nt + ￿3b !t): (AF5)















Therefore, pt+1 ￿ pt is given by,






















(ii) From the linearised Euler equation for consumption given in Eq. 79 and using Eq.















(￿1 + ￿2)(￿1 ￿ ￿3￿6)
￿2 + ￿5￿6
b nt + (￿ ￿ 1)e:
(iii) Substituting Eqs. AF5, AF6 and AF7 into Eq. 91 yields,






(1 ￿ ￿ +
1 + ￿
￿2 + ￿5￿6





f(￿1 + ￿2)(￿6￿4 + 1+￿








































Finally, substituting the above equation in the clearing market condition stated in Eq. 96






























f(1 + ￿)￿6 + ￿2￿4gb nt +
￿
2









f2￿5￿1 ￿ ￿￿4gkt + f￿
(1 + ￿)
2
￿6 + 1 ￿ ￿2￿5￿1 +
￿
2
































Finally, since prices are fully ￿exible in the steady state it must be true that e = 0:
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